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Did the United States Supreme Court Make a
Bonfire with the Bundle of Sticks? The Tenancy by
the Entireties Before and After United States v.
Craft, with an Emphasis on Pennsylvania Law
INTRODUCTION
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Musmanno once remarked
that:
[A] [h]usband and wife own an estate in entireties as if it were
a living tree, whose fruits they share together. To split the
tree in two would be to kill it and then it would not be what it
was before when either could enjoy its shelter, shade, and
fruit as much as the other.'
Until recently, this view of tenancy by the entireties as an indi-
visible unit, untouchable by the creditors of only one spouse, has
remained in some states that recognize this form of property own-
ership.2 On April 17th, 2002, the Supreme Court of the United
States, in United States v. Craft,3 drastically altered this concept.
Once upon a time, the Supreme Court of the United States al-
lowed states to determine their own rules of property and these
rules were binding upon the federal courts.4 This hands-off ap-
proach was first changed in 1958 in United States v. Bess.5 In
Bess, the Supreme Court of the United States held that state law
only determines what interests a person has in property.' This
concept was further clarified in United States v. National Bank of
Commerce,7 in which the majority stated, "state law defined the
1. Sterrett v. Sterrett, 166 A.2d 1, 2 (Pa. 1960).
2. See Steve R. Johnson, After Drye: The Likely Attachment of the Federal Tax Lien to
Tenancy-By-The-Entireties Interests, 75 Ind. L. J. 1163, 1170 n.42 (2000). Fifteen of the
twenty-four states that recognize a tenancy by the entireties hold this view. Those fifteen
states are: Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Virginia, Vermont, and Wyoming. In
addition, the District of Colombia and the Virgin Islands, also adhere to the view that a
creditor of only one spouse cannot attach entireties property. Id.
3. 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002).
4. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 501 (1930).
5. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
6. Id. at 56-57.
7. 472 U.S. 713 (1985).
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nature of the taxpayer's interest in the property, but the state-law
consequences of that definition are of no concern to the operation
of the federal tax law."8
The Supreme Court's present view of state property law was
enunciated in Drye v. United States.' In Drye, the majority held
that state law is only initially examined to find any rights the tax-
payer has in the property and then federal law is used to deter-
mine if the taxpayer's rights are "property" or "rights to prop-
erty"'" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. §6321.11 Drye set the stage
for United States v. Craft'2 and its recent attack on the tenancy by
the entirety. Part I of this comment explores the history of the
federal case law that has led to Craft. Part II discusses the his-
tory of Craft. Finally, Part III will examine the history of tenancy
by the entireties in Pennsylvania case law and will address the
impact Craft may have on Pennsylvania property law cases and
bankruptcy cases.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE TREATMENT OF THE TENANCY BY THE
ENTIRETIES IN FEDERAL CASE LAW
In 1930, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Tyler
v. United States.13 This case was a consolidation of three separate
cases. 4 The first case, No. 428, involved stock held as a tenancy
by the entireties.15 The husband had died and the stock was in-
cluded in his gross estate, upon which tax was paid. 6 The district
court found that the stock should not have been included and the
court of appeals reversed. 7 The second case, No. 546, involved the
same concepts but the properties held as a tenancy by the entire-
ties were real estate and ground rents. 8 The Commissioner of In-
8. Id. at 723.
9. 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
10. Id. at 58 (quoting United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 722
(1985)).
11. 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (2003) provides in pertinent part, "If any person liable to pay any
tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount .. .shall be a lien in
favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether real or per-
sonal belonging to such person." Id.
12. 122 S. Ct. 1414 (2002).
13. 281 U.S. 497 (1930).
14. Id. at 499-500.
15. Id. at 499.
16. Id.
17. Id. The courts involved were the United States District Court of Maryland and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Id.
18. Tyler, 281 U.S. at 499.
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ternal Revenue wanted the property to be included in the hus-
band's estate following his death, but the Board of Tax Appeals
found that there was no deficiency and the property did not have
to be included. 9 The district court agreed with the Board of Tax
Appeals and the court of appeals affirmed." The third case, No.
547, involved the same concepts, and the property held as a ten-
ancy by the entireties was also real estate.21 The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue included the real estate in the wife's estate after
her death.22 The Board of Tax Appeals disagreed with the Com-
missioner and the court of appeals affirmed the Board's decision.2"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in each case
and consolidated the cases.
The issue presented before the justices was whether it was con-
stitutional, under the Fifth Amendment,24 for property held as a
tenancy by the entireties to be included in the estate of the de-
ceased spouse in order to determine the appropriate tax. 25 The
Court found that property held by the entireties could be included
in the estate of the deceased spouse in order to determine the ap-
propriate tax.26 The majority reasoned that including a tenancy by
the entireties in the gross estate of a deceased spouse in order to
measure the appropriate tax was "neither arbitrary nor capri-
cious "27 so as not to violate the Fifth Amendment rights of the sur-
viving spouse." This early case also stated that federal courts
were bound by state rules of property;2 9 however, this would soon
change.0
In the years following Tyler, several of the United States Courts
of Appeals decided cases that gave property law power to the
19. Id.
20. Id. at 499-500. The courts involved in this case were the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. Id.
21. Id. at 500.
22. Id.
23. Tyler, 281 U.S. at 500. The court involved in this case was the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Id.
24. The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part, "No
person shall be .. .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
25. Tyler, 281 U.S. at 498-99, 505.
26. Id. at 505.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 501.
30. See Drye, 528 U.S. at 49.
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states. In Jones v. Kemp3 and in United States v. Hutcherson32 the
United States Courts of Appeals for the 10th and 8th Circuits, re-
spectively, found that the United States cannot take property held
in a tenancy by the entireties from one spouse to satisfy the sole
debt of the other spouse, even if the claim is being brought to col-
lect federal taxes.33
One year following Hutcherson, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit decided Raffaele v. Granger.34 Antonio
Raffaele owed the IRS certain sums of money from back taxes.35
The Collector of Internal Revenue levied upon the bank account of
Antonio and his wife. The couple then brought a complaint to
the United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania to terminate the levy, which was granted by the district
court.3 ' The Collector then appealed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.38 The issue was whether the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) could levy upon a bank account owned
by husband and wife as a tenancy by the entireties in order to col-
lect taxes owed solely by the husband.39 The court of appeals, rely-
ing primarily on Jones and Hutcherson, decided that the IRS could
not levy on a bank account that was owned as a tenancy by the
entireties.4"
Without any United States Supreme Court decision on the sub-
ject, the United States Courts of Appeals continued to decide cases
involving a tenancy by the entireties in favor of rejecting the
claims of a creditor of one spouse on the entireties property. In
1971, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was
faced with an issue similar to that in Raffaele. In Cole v. Car-
doza,4' the issue was whether a federal tax lien owed only by the
husband could attach to a tenancy by the entireties. 4" The case
involved the gambling activities of Eugene Cole.43 Mr. Cole owed
the IRS tax on his winnings, so the IRS placed a tax lien upon Mr.
31. 144 F.2d 478 (10th Cir. 1944).
32. 188 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1951).
33. See Jones, 144 F.2d at 478; Hutcherson, 188 F. 2d at 326.
34. 196 F.2d 620 (3d Cir. 1952).




39. Raffaele, 196 F.2d at 622.
40. Id. at 623.
41. 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1971).
42. Id. at 1343.
43. Id. at 1338.
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and Mrs. Cole's home, which was held as a tenancy by the entire-
ties.44 The court found that the federal tax lien was a cloud on the
tenancy by the entireties, and that the husband and wife could
have the lien declared a nullity.45
The Supreme Court of the United States, in 1985, finally de-
cided a case that would clarify some of the law related to state
property rules, federal property rules, and which interests credi-
tors could attach. In United States v. National Bank of Com-
merce," the Supreme Court of the United States decided the issue
of whether the IRS could levy a jointly held bank account when
only one of the joint owners owed federal income tax.47 The Court
first had to determine if state or federal law was controlling to
decide if the joint owners individually had rights to the bank ac-
count that could be levied upon the IRS. 8  The majority relied
upon United States v. Bess49 to determine that since the joint own-
ers could withdraw from the joint account without telling the
other joint owners under state law, there existed a sufficient in-
terest in the property to which the IRS could levy to collect unpaid
taxes.0 The Court clarified Bess by stating that "state law defined
the nature of the taxpayer's interest in the property, but the state-
law consequences of that definition are of no concern to the opera-
tion of the federal tax law."' The majority concluded by holding
that the IRS could levy on the joint account of the taxpayer.
52
Even though National Bank of Commerce specifically stated that if
money is kept in a joint bank account as a tenancy by the entire-
ties, the Government cannot levy on the joint account to satisfy
the debts of one spouse, 3 it marked the beginning of the end of the
tenancy by the entireties as a protection against creditors of only
one spouse.
Following National Bank of Commerce, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit made one last attempt to prevent
a tenancy by the entireties from being levied or attached by the
44. Id. at 1343.
45. Id. at 1344.
46. 472 U.S. 713 (1984).
47. Id. at 716. Roy Reeves, his wife, and his mother in this case held the bank account
as a joint account. Id. Roy Reeves owed the delinquent taxes. Id.
48. Id. at 722.
49. 357 U.S. 51 (1958).
50. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722-25.
51. Id. at 723.
52. Id. at 731.
53. Id. at 729.
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creditors of only one spouse in Internal Revenue Service v. Gaster.54
In this case, Donald Gaster and his wife held a bank account as a
tenancy by the entireties." Donald owed back taxes to the IRS
from 1977, and, in 1990 the IRS levied on the bank account.56 The
bank filed a complaint against the IRS and the Gasters, which
was removed by the IRS to the United States District Court for
the District of Delaware.57 The district court found that the IRS
had a right to levy on the account." The Gasters appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 9 The issue
was whether the IRS could levy on a bank account, owned jointly
by a husband and wife, in order to collect on the husband's unpaid
taxes."° The court relied on Pennsylvania law to determine the
taxpayer's interest in the property. Citing National Bank of
Commerce,"3 the court found that under Pennsylvania law the
husband had no interest in the tenancy by the entireties to which
the IRS levy could attach." The court concluded by stating that
the IRS levy was incorrect because the creditor of one spouse could
not attach entireties property.63
The most recent United States Supreme Court case to address
this issue, before United States v. Craft, was Drye v. United
States.4 Even though Drye did not involve entireties property, the
opinion laid the foundation upon which Craft was later decided.
In Drye, Rohn Drye's mother had died, leaving her estate to him.65
Rohn Drye had owed the IRS back taxes, so he disclaimed his in-
terest in his mother's estate and the estate passed to his daugh-
ter.6 Arkansas law would not permit Rohn Drye's creditors to at-
tach the disclaimed estate. Rohn's daughter placed the funds
54. 42 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1994).
55. Id. at 789.
56. Id. at 790.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Gaster, 42 F.3d at 790.
60. Id. at 789.
61. Id. at 791. The Gaster court quotes from National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at
729 n.ll (citing Raffaele, 196 F.2d at 622, which states, if an account is held as tenants by
the entireties under Pennsylvania law the IRS's "attempt to deal separately with or dispose
of the interest of one is in derogation of the other spouse's ownership of the entire property
and, therefore, legally ineffective.") Id.
62. Gaster, 42 F.3d at 791.
63. Id. at 795.
64. 528 U.S. 49 (1999).
65. Id. at 52-53.
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id.
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from the estate into a spendthrift trust, which she and her parents
used.68 The IRS then tried to levy on the trust. 9 The trust filed a
wrongful levy action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Arkansas, which ruled in favor of the IRS."0
The trust appealed and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision." The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
amongst the circuit courts.72
The Court relied on National Bank of Commerce to determine
whether federal or state law should govern what right or interests
a taxpayer has in property." The majority stated, "[w]e look ini-
tially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in
the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to
determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify
as 'property' or 'rights to property' within the compass of the fed-
eral tax lien legislation."74 The Court reasoned that under Arkan-
sas law, Rohn Drye had a power to direct the estate's assets and
this power was a form of "property" or a "right to property" upon
which the IRS could levy." The majority concluded that Rohn
Drye had a sufficient property interest upon which the IRS could
levy and therefore the decision of the court of appeals was af-
firmed.76 As previously stated, Drye did not involve entireties
property but it in essence broadened the definition of "property" or
"rights to property" for federal tax lien purposes, which opened the
door for United States v. Craft.
II. UNITED STATES V. CRAFT - THE WOOD IS GATHERED FOR THE
BONFIRE
The beginning of the long road to Craft occurred in 1972, when
Don and Sandra Craft purchased a piece of real estate as tenants
68. Id. at 53-54.
69. Drye, 528 U.S. at 54.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court of appeals opinion can be found at Drye Family 1995 Trust v. U.S.,
152 F. 3d 892 (1998).
72. Id. at 55. Certiorari was granted atDrye v. United States, 526 U.S. 1063 (1999).
73, Drye, 528 U.S. at 58.
74. Id.




by the entireties." Don Craft did not pay federal income tax from
1979 until 1987.8 In 1989, the IRS filed a federal tax lien on the
real estate.79 Subsequently, Don and Sandra Craft quitclaimed
the property to Sandra only.8" Don Craft then filed for bankruptcy
and was discharged in Chapter 7 in 1992.81 Sandra Craft at-
tempted to sell the property, but the IRS refused to discharge the
tax lien unless they received one-half of the proceeds.82 The pro-
ceeds were placed in an escrow account and Sandra Craft sought
to quiet title in those funds in a proceeding in the United States
District Court of the Western District of Michigan.83 The district
court, relying on a variety of decisions from the United States
Courts of Appeals84 and from the United States Supreme Court,85
determined that the tenancy by the entireties was terminated by
the joint conveyance to Sandra Craft which allowed the IRS's lien
to attach to Don Craft's half of the property.88
Sandra Craft appealed and the IRS cross-appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.87 The court of ap-
peals cited Cole v. Cardoza88 as the authority to prevent the IRS
from attaching the entireties property. 9 The court quoted from
Cole stating, "[TIhe lien is without legal effect as it pertains to [the
husband's and wife's] house."9" The court of appeals, like the dis-
trict court, discussed Leroy Lane I1 and Leroy Lane 1,92 as author-
ity to conclude that the federal tax lien did not attach to the en-
77. Craft v. United States, No. 1:93-CV-306, 1994 WL 669680, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Sept.






82. Craft, 1994 WL 669680, at *1.
83. Id.
84. See Cole, 441 F.2d at 1337; United States v. Certain Real Property at 2525 Leroy
Lane, 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990) cert. denied sub nom; Marks v. United States, 499
United States 947 (1991); United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 2525 Leroy
Lane, 972 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1992); Craft, 1994 WL 669680, at *2-3.
85. See Nat. Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713; United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677
(1983); Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509 (1960), rehearing denied 216 N.Y.S.2d 1025
(1961); Bess, 357 U.S. 51. Craft, 1994 WL 669680, at *2.
86. Craft, 1994 WL 669680, at *3.
87. Craft v. United States, 140 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 1998), rev'd 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
88. 441 F.2d 1337 (6th Cir. 1791).
89. Craft, 140 F.3d at 642.
90. Id. (quoting Cole, 441 F. 2d at 1344).
91. 910 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1990)
92. 972 F.2d 136 (6th Cir. 1992).
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tireties property.93 The court of appeals, however, remanded the
case to the district court to determine if Don Craft's conveyance of
the property to his wife was a fraudulent conveyance.
94
In 1999, the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Michigan revisited Craft on remand from the court of ap-
peals.95 The issue presented before the district court was whether
the conveyance of the entireties property from Don Craft to his
wife for one dollar was a fraudulent conveyance, such that the IRS
could recover, although it was entireties property to which the
federal tax lien would not normally attach.96 The district court
looked to Michigan's Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act97 to de-
termine that the conveyance from Don to his wife was not solely a
fraudulent conveyance.98 The court found, however, that even
though the actual conveyance was not fraudulent, whatever
money was spent by Don Craft to improve the entireties property
while he was insolvent was a harm to his creditors. 9  The court
concluded that the IRS was entitled to whatever Don Craft paid in
principal from 1980 to 1985, a sum of $6,693; however the re-
mainder of the escrowed proceeds were to go to Mrs. Craft.0 0
Craft was again headed for the court of appeals.' The IRS ap-
pealed, believing that they should be awarded the entire escrowed
amount.' 2 Sandra Craft cross-appealed, arguing that she should
not have to pay the IRS any money.' 3 The court of appeals first
reasoned that the IRS could not re-argue their case due to the law
of the case doctrine.' The IRS asserted that Drye, decided after
93. Craft, 140 F.3d at 642.
94. Id. at 644.
95. United States v. Craft, 65 F. Supp. 2d 651 (W.D. Mich. 1999), appeal dismissed 233
F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
96. Id. at 654.
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 566.14, repealed by P.A. 1998, No. 434 §13 provided in perti-
nent part, "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred by a person who is or will
thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors without regard to his actual intent
if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration." Id. In
addition, MICH. COMP. LAws § 566.17, repealed by P.A. 1998, No. 434 §13 provided in perti-
nent part, "Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred with actual intent, as
distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, delay, or defraud either present or
future creditors, is fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." Id.
98. Craft, 65 F. Supp 2d at 658.
99. Id. at 658-59.
100. Id. at 661-62.
101. Craft v. United States, 233 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd 535 U.S. 274 (2002).
102. Id. at 363.
103. Id.
104. The law of the case doctrine is simply that "issues decided at an early stage of the
litigation, either explicitly or by necessary inference from the disposition, constitute the law
Summer 2003
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Craft I, changed the state of the law such that federal law deter-
mines whether a federal tax lien can attach to property and state
legal fictions, such as the tenancy by the entireties, do not control
federal law when a federal tax lien is involved. °5 The court of ap-
peals found that their first ruling in Craft I was consistent with
Drye and that the IRS's claims were lacking in merit; thus the law
of the case doctrine did in fact apply.1 6 Consequently, the court of
appeals affirmed the district court's ruling and awarded the IRS
$6,693.17
Following the decision by the court of appeals, the IRS peti-
tioned the United States Supreme Court, which granted certio-
rari."' Craft was argued on January 14th, 2002, and finally de-
cided on April 17th, 2002, thirty years after Don and Sandra had
purchased their entireties property and fourteen years after the
IRS first assessed a tax deficiency against the now deceased Don
Craft. Justice O'Connor authored the opinion of the Court, which
was joined by five justices, with three justices dissenting.' 9 The
issue the Supreme Court addressed was "whether a tenant by the
entireties possesses 'property' or 'rights to property' to which a
federal tax lien may attach.""' The majority used the common
"bundle of sticks" analogy to explain what rights a person can
have in property."' The Court stated, "state law determines only
which sticks are in a person's bundle. Whether those sticks qual-
ify as 'property' for the purposes of the federal tax lien statute is a
question of federal law.""
2
The majority then determined what rights Don Craft had in his
entireties property in Michigan."' The Court stated that these
rights include:
The right to use the property, the right to exclude third par-
ties from it, the right to a share of income produced from it,
the right of survivorship, the right to become a tenant in
common with equal shares upon divorce, the right to sell the
of the case." Hanover Ins. Co. v. American Eng'g Co., 105 F.3d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1997).
105. Craft, 233 F.3d at 366.
106. Id. at 367-68.
107. Id. at 375.
108. United States v. Craft, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
109. Id. at 1419.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1420.
112. Id.
113. Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1422.
766 Vol. 41
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property with the respondent's consent and to receive half the
proceeds from such a sale, the right to place an encumbrance
on the property with the respondent's consent, and the right
to block respondent from selling or encumbering the property
unilaterally.""
The majority next addressed the question of whether these
rights were sufficient to qualify as 'property' or 'rights to property'
under the federal tax code."5 The Court reasoned that since Don
Craft had a significant number of sticks in the bundle, he there-
fore had 'property' or 'rights to property' to which a federal tax lien
could attach."6 The majority concluded by finding that Don Craft
did indeed have 'property' or 'rights to property' to which the fed-
eral tax lien could attach, meaning that the IRS was entitled to
Don Craft's half of the proceeds from the sale of the property."7
This decision has directly led to an upheaval of the current under-
standing of the law of entireties property in regards to creditors.
The next section will demonstrate how this decision will affect
Pennsylvania, a tenancy by the entireties state.
III. PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY OF THE TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES
AND FUTURE CONSEQUENCES
The tenancy by the entireties has always existed in Pennsyl-
vania. Following the passage of the Married Woman's Act on
April 11th, 1848,"'8 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania authored
Diver v. Diver,"9 which expressly retained a tenancy by the entire-
ties as a form of property ownership in Pennsylvania. 2 ° With the
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1424. The Court also made a very compelling argument by stating, "that the
rights of respondent's husband in the entireties property constitute "property" or "rights to
property" "belonging to" him is further underscored by the fact that, if the conclusion were
otherwise, the entireties property would belong to no one for the purposes of [26 U.S.C.]
§6321." Id.
117. Id. at 1425.
118. There were three Acts involved - The Acts of April 11th, 1848, P.L. 536, 48 P.S.
§64, June 3rd, 1887, P.L. 332, and June 8th, 1893, P.L. 344, 48 P.S. §32. These Acts gave
married women the property rights of single women. Id.
119. 56 Pa. 106 (1867).
120. Id. at 108. The tenancy by the entireties remained the same as before the Acts
were passed. See McCardy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39 (1870) (if someone purchased one spouse's
share the purchaser had no right of possession during the other spouse's life); Beihl v. Mar-
tin, 84 A. 953 (Pa. 1912) (one spouse cannot sell the expectancy of survivorship without the




retention of this form of property ownership, Pennsylvania has
adhered to the principle that entireties property cannot be reached
by the creditors of one spouse. 2 '
In 1946, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed the is-
sue of whether a "judgment creditor of a husband [may] attach, in
execution, the joint bank account of a husband and wife held as
tenants by the entireties," in United States National Bank in
Johnstown v. Penrod.'22 In Penrod, a husband and wife owned an
account as tenants by the entireties.'23 The court found that the
husband's creditors could not attach the account, and if the wife
survived the husband, the creditors of the husband could never
attach the account. 24 However, if the husband survived the wife,
his creditors could then attach the account.'
The law as stated in Penrod has remained in Pennsylvania
without any change 26 on the horizon until United States v. Craft.
Craft has altered the way a tenancy by the entireties will be
viewed throughout the future. Before Craft, entireties property
was not reachable by the creditors of only one spouse. Only joint
creditors could attach or levy on entireties property. Now, the Su-
preme Court of the United States has allowed the IRS to levy on
entireties property, even though only one spouse owes the debt.1
27
The Court made this determination by finding that each spouse
has a sufficient number of sticks from the bundle of property
rights to which a creditor may attach. 28 This decision leaves open
the issue of whether all creditors may now attach entireties prop-
erty in a manner similar to the IRS. If this is true, Pennsylvania
law will be completely changed.
Not only has Craft possibly changed this aspect of Pennsylvania
law, but the opinion has also raised the question of how bankrupt-
121. See In re Meyer's Estate, 81 A. 145 (Pa. 1911); Beihl, 84 A. at 953; Bostrom v. Nat.
Bank of McKeesport, 198 A. 644 (Pa. 1938); Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co., 200
A. 624 (Pa. 1938).
122. 47 A.2d 249 (Pa. 1946).
123. Id. at 250.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See Amadon v. Amadon, 59 A.2d 135 (Pa. 1948); Sterrett, 166 A.2d at 1; McGary v.
Lewis, 119 A.2d 497 (Pa. 1956); Stinner v. Stinner, 446 A.2d 651 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982), rev'd
554 A.2d 45 (Pa. 1989), cert. denied 492 U.S. 919 (1989); Patwardham v. Brabart, 439 A.2d
784 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Garden State Standardbred Sales Co. v. Seese, 611 A.2d 1239
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); Constitution Bank v. Olson, 620 A.2d 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993);
Koffman v. Smith, 682 A.2d 1282 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
127. Craft, 122 S. Ct. at 1424.
128. Id. at 1425.
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cies will be handled in Pennsylvania or any state recognizing a
tenancy by the entireties. In In re Barsotti,"9 Joseph V. Barsotti
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7.13' His wife, however, did not
join in the bankruptcy.' The debtor claimed that any property he
held with his wife as a tenancy by the entireties was exempt from
the bankruptcy estate.'32 The trustee challenged the exemptions.'33
The Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
found that "the law in Pennsylvania is clear and without dispute
that entireties property is immune from process, including: parti-
tion, levy, execution, and sale, or in bankruptcy, where only one
spouse is a debtor."134 The bankruptcy court held that the debtor
could exempt all of his property that he held as a tenancy by the
entireties from the bankruptcy estate.'35 If only one spouse is in
bankruptcy, creditors for joint debts may attach the entireties
property. 3 ' Following the reasoning of Craft, it would seem that
all property, whether held as a tenancy by the entireties or not,
could possibly be subject to the bankruptcy estate even if only one
spouse files for bankruptcy. This would eliminate the entireties
exemption and afford no protection to the non-debtor spouse.
As of August 2003, no Pennsylvania state court has cited United
States v. Craft; however bankruptcy courts in the state have ad-
dressed the case once. In In re Basher,'37 the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was faced
with the same issue that occurred in Craft, namely whether a lien
of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") that is only owed by one
spouse can attach to a tenancy by the entireties and what is the
value of such an attachment.' Mark Basher and Marcella Basher
owned a residence as a tenancy by the entireties.9  The IRS had a
tax claim against Mark Basher who had filed for bankruptcy un-
der Chapter 13.14 The court determined that the IRS lien did in
fact attach to the property that was held as a tenancy by the en-
129. 7 B.R. 205 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980).




134. In re Barsotti, 7 B.R. at 209.
135. Id. at 213.
136. See In re Cipa, 11 B.R. 968 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981).
137. Bankr. No. 02-12328DWS, Adversary No. 02-0346, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1467
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2002).
138. Id. at*1.
139. Id. at *5.
140. Id. at *2.
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tireties based upon the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Craft.
14 1
The court was next faced with how to determine the value of
such an attachment.' 42  The court found that the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Craft "not only failed to provide
any guidance on how the property rights would be valued but ex-
pressly refused to decide whether the survivorship interest in and
of itself was a present interest.' 4 3  In the present case, the IRS
argued that the attachment lien should be worth 50% of the fair
market value of the property and the debtor argued that the at-
tachment lien should not have any value due to his wife's survi-
vorship interest in the property. 44 Unfortunately, the court did
not agree with either party as of the date of this opinion and




Based on this recent case interpreting United States v. Craft, it
is still unclear as to what import Craft will have in bankruptcy
law. Clearly, after Craft, a tax lien may attach to a tenancy by the
entireties, even when only owed by one spouse, but if the value of
such a lien is nothing until the tenancy by the entireties is termi-
nated then Craft may have not really changed anything at all. If
however, the valuation is 50% then the import of Craft will be-
come clear.
CONCLUSION
The aforementioned issues are only the beginning of what could
be the elimination of the tenancy by the entireties. Some may in-
terpret Craft more narrowly and find that only IRS liens may at-
tach to entireties property,146 but if one reads the majority's opin-
141. In re Basher, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS 1467 at *13.
142. Id.
143. Id. at *14.
144. Id. at *16-*17.
145. Id. at *18.
146. See Daniel C. Bruton, Pavlov's Dog, the Chicken and the Egg: Decision in United
States v. Craft Should Have Minimal Impact, 2002 ABI JNL. LEXIS 170, *1 (2002). The
author of this article takes the position that United States v. Craft will only ever reach
federal tax liens and never be extended by the courts to apply to general creditors. Id. at
*4. However, this author also states that "it is conceivable that the Supreme Court's de-
termination that a federal tax lien attaches to entireties property will not even apply in the
bankruptcy context." Id. at *6. This comment has not received validation, particularly in
light of the recent decision by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, In re Basher, in which the court specifically allowed a federal tax lien to
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ion carefully there is a lot more stated than just that. If each
spouse is now said to have a sufficient interest in entireties prop-
erty to which a tax lien may attach, what is to prevent any credi-
tor of only one spouse from making the same argument? If this
happens then the tenancy by the entireties will no longer be a
needed form of property ownership. Holding property as a ten-
ancy by the entireties will no longer afford any more protection
then holding property as tenants in common.
It is unknown how far Craft will be taken until it is tested. One
thing that is certain is that the United States Supreme Court will
have to revisit this issue in the near future in order to clarify if the
privilege they have extended to the IRS tax lien will indeed be ex-
tended to other creditors. If at that time the privilege is extended,
then the tenancy by the entireties will not have any reason to ex-
ist as a form of property ownership. Then, United States v. Craft
will truly have marked the beginning of the end for the tenancy by
the entireties and the Supreme Court of the United States will
have burnt the bundle of sticks of entireties property and scat-
tered the ashes.
Angela Sheffler
attach to entireties property in a bankruptcy context. In re Basher, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS
1467 at *17.
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